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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FED ERATED MILK PRODUCERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
STATEWIDE PLUMBING AND
HEATING CO., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

No.
9214

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, Federated Milk Producers' Association, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff or Federated, sued Appellant
Statewide Plumbing and Heating Co., hereinafter referred to
as defendant or Statewide, and West Jordan, Inc., for property
damage sustained by reason of an accident which occurred
on Redwood Road at about 8700 South in Salt Lake County,
Utah, on the early morning of June 13, 1958. During the
course of the trial, Federated voluntarily dismissed the action
as against the defendant West Jordan, Inc.
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Federated cannot agree with the statement of facts contained in Statewide's brief, and so to more accurately state
the facts and to supplement the same, the following is respectfully submitted.
On June 12, 1958, Statewide commenced the construction
of a sewer line along the east side of Redwood Road in the
vicinity of 8700 South. The operation consisted of digging a
trench by means of a trenching machine and depositing the
dirt from the trench along the east one-half of Redwood Road
so that it entirely blocked the one lane provided for northbound
traffic (R. 154, 167 and 173-Exhibits 2 and 3).
The only signs warning of any construction on the road
in the area were located some two and one-half to three blocks
south of the windro'v of dirt obstructing the roadway. These
consisted of two signs, one reading HConstruction Slow," and
the other read ((One Lane Traffic." They were placed off the
east edge of the roadway near 9000 South Street and one of
them had a singe flare pot in front of it (R. 83). There was
no obstruction on the roadway for the two-tenths of a mile
between these signs and the windrow of dirt where the accident
occurred ( R. 8 3) .
The roadway surface was dry black top (R. 85 and 87).
The posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour (R. 100 and 106).
The weather was clear (R. 86). It was extremely dark on
this night and the only illumination in the area were street
lights of the old fashioned type with 150 watt bulbs screwed
into a receptacle attached to every other light pole. The nearest
street light to the place of the accident was 80 to 85 feet
south of the impact area (R. 87 and 156). It was so dark that
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witness Paskett walked direct! y through the barrow pit or
ditch filled with milk which he couldn't see (R. 171). Witness
Seal said he was unable to read the white lettering on Federated's truck (R. 156 and 167).
At approxin1ately 2:48 A.M. on the morning of the
accident, Federated's employee, Carman C. Jensen, was driving
a 1956 International Diesel Tank Truck north along Redwood
Road, having entered this roadway at about 14000 South
Street (R. 112, 114 and 115). He was traveling approximately
30 to 35 miles per hour (R. 117 and Exhibit No. 8). Jensen
does not remernber seeing any signs indicating the road was
blocked ahead and did not observe the obstruction in the roadway until his truck was about 75 to 100 feet south of the pile
of dirt and trencher situated in the lane for northbound traffic
(R. 115). There was another vehicle approaching Jensen at
this time and it was traveling south in the opposite lane of
traffic. Jensen dimmed the lights on the truck as he approached
this oncoming vehicle (R. 115 and 116). Just after passing
this vehicle, Jensen observed the dirt obstructing his lane of
traffic and he im1nediately applied his brakes and swerved to
his left in an effort to avoid the obstruction (R. 117). Jensen
\Vas unsuccessful in avoiding the dirt and as the truck struck
the obstruction, the load of milk shifted and caused the truck
to slowly overturn (R. 117). Jensen testified that the headlights of the oncoming vehicle interferred with his vision and
until a moment after it passed his truck, he could not see the
obstruction ahead (R. 119, 134 and 151).
The investigating police officer measured the roadway
to be 33 feet in width with 3 foot shoulders (R. 84 and 85).
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The windrow of dirt was 4 to 5 feet high, about 165 feet in
length, and came within 6 inches of the center line of the
roadway so as to block the lane for northbound traffic (R. 84,
85, 86, 108 and 131, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4). There were no flare
pots burning to warn traffic approaching from the south of
the presence of the dirt obstructing the northbound lane of
traffic. The flare pots there were cold and without oil (R. 91,
92, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 167, 171 and 172
-Exhibits 2 and 3) . The one flare pot burning was on the
roadway at the north end of the windrow of dirt and could
not be seen by anyone approaching from the south (R. 165
and 166).
At the conclusion of the trial, the issues were submitted
by the trial court to the jury and a verdict was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff Federated and against the defendant
Statewide for the sum of $8657.10, and Judgment on Verdict
was entered for that amount (R. 62 and 63).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY.
POINT II
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WAS A COR·
RECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE FACTS

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OF THIS CASE AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO TI-fE
DEFENDANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

Tt-IE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY.
The 1ssues of negligence and contributory negligence
were proper! y submitted to the jury as questions of fact. The
defendant has cited several Utah cases in support of its First
Point, however, none of these cases have fact situations similar
to the instant case, with the exception of Fretz vs. Anderson,
5 Utah 2d 290, 300 Pac. 2d 642. In O'Brien vs. Alston, 61
Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791, the facts clearly indicated that the
automobile crashing into the barricade had defective headlights. The testimony of the plaintiff's son who was driving
the automoible in that case was to the effect that a type of
shade or cover was placed over part of the headlight to lower
the beam to the pavement and effectually decreased the range
of the headlights. The evidence indicated that the beam fron1
the headlights was not of sufficient distance to conform to
state statute. Had the plaintiff's automobile headlights been
properly adjusted as required by law, the driver likely should
have seen the barricade in time to stop. Unlike our case at hand,
the facts of the O'Brien case clearly show there was nothing
of any nature to limit or interfere with the driver's vision
other than defective headlights. Under such a state of facts,
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the court correct! y held the driver of the automobile guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In the case of Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Co.,
80 Utah 331, 15 Pac. 2d 309, this court held that a driver
unable to stop his vehicle to avoid an obstruction within the
distance lighted by his headlamps is guilty of negligence.
Under the facts of the Dalley case, there was no excuse for
the driver of the automobile not seeing the obstruction in the
highway. This court again affirmed the rule that a motorist
is normally required to operate his automobile so he can see
and avoid substantial discernable objects in the road ahead.
We have no quarrel with defendant's argument that ccwhile
numerous exceptions have already been carved out of the
original statement of the rule, it nevertheless is still controlling
case law." (Brief of Appellant, Page 9). Given the same set
of facts as those established in the Dalley case, the same
conclusion would probably be reached today. The defendant
recognizes that there are exceptions to this rule. One of these
exceptions has been applied in the case of Fretz vs. Anderson,
supra. In this case, unlike those previously cited, the plaintiff
driver was troubled by interference with her vision from the
lights of a truck parked on the edge of the highway and
facing in her direction. She stated that she was temporarily
blinded by these headlights, and immediately upon seeing the
obstruction in the highway, applied her brakes but did not
have sufficient time in which to stop her automobile. This
court, speaking through Chief Justice McDonough, said at
page 298:
CCThe rule that a motorist is normally required to
so operate his machine as to be able to see and avoid
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substantial discernable objects in the road ahead is
generally recognized, as is its concommittant that the
motorist must equip his machine with proper headlights and be able to stop within the distance of the
light's projection. However, this does not mean that
a motorist striking an object in the highway is guilty
of negligence as a matter of law under any and all
conditions."
This court then said, in reference to the case of N ikoleropoulos
vs. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 Pac. 304:
((But this case has been modified by subsequent cases
permitting the jury to determine, in the light of existing
conditions, what a reasonable and prudent person would
do under the circumstances." (Italics ours).
In the instant case, defendant, in support of its argument,
states that the plaintiff's driver admittedly was not ((blinded"
by the oncoming headlights nor was the approaching car a
((sudden or unanticipated'' interference. Considering this
problem, the court said on page 299 of the Fretz case:
ttHowever, as respondent points out, neither the fog
in the Trimble case nor the curve in the Hodges case
were unforeseeable, and in those cases the motorist
was not required to stop but merely to exercise more
than ordinary amount of care."
The court then refers to an extensive annotation on the subject
cited in 22 ALR 2d 297. The very problem we have in the
instant case was considered in the case of Frowd vs. Marchbank, 154 Wash. 634, 283 Pac. 467. In that case the Washington court stated:
the trial court held, if we have correctly gathered its meaning, that the negligence of the appellant
consisted in driving past an automobile whose lights
tt

•••
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obscured the vtston of the highway behind it. But
everyone who has driven an automobile in the night
time, and every observant person who has ridden in
an automobile in the nighttime and has met an oncoming automobile with burning lights, knows that the
lights obscure objects behind it for a considerable
distance before the automobile is reached until a time
after its lights are past, and to say that it is negligence
to drive past an automobile in such a situation is
practically to say that it is negligence to drive along
the highway in the nighttime at all. It must be remembered that both automobiles are in the same situation,
and, if one must stop, so must the other, and, if the
rule stated by the court is to be applied, it would
require some rather intricate maneuvering for the one
to get by the other without violating the law ... "
This Court recognized· the sound reasoning contained in the
above quotation from the Frowd case, by adopting the same
verbatim in the Fretz case, and concluding therefrom, at page
300:
~'The

jury determined that her conduct was reasonable under the circumstances and we feel that the law
lays no heavier duty upon her."
Thus, there need not be a sudden or unexpected interference
with the vision of plaintiff's driver to create a question of fact
for the jury in determining the possible contributory negligence of this driver. Defendant has stated at page 10 of its
brief:
''Where such headlights are dimmed as required by
law, they cannot on any logical basis furnish an excuse
for failing to see otherwise obvious obstructions upon
the highway."
This court has specifically held to the contrary in the Fretz
case.
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Although the evidence in our instant case shows there
was a sign to the south of the scene of the accident indicating
one lane traffic ahead, plaintiff's driver traveled one-fifth of
a mile without observing anything on the highway, nor was
there any indication as to which lane of traffic was obstructed.
The fact there was an approaching car from the other direction
was not controlling. Plaintiff's driver had no more reason to
anticipate that his lane of traffic would be blocked than did
the approaching driver.
The case of Kansas Transit Transport Company vs.
Browning, 219 Fed. 2d 890, and cited by the defendant, is
not a case followed by the rna jority of the jurisdictions in the
United States. This case follo\vs the principle that there must
be a sudden and unexpected blinding to relieve the driver of
an automobile from being charged with contributory negFgence
as a matter of law. Our court has expressly refused to follow
this rule. Fretz vs. Anderson, supra.
In the case of Artz vs. Herrera, 325 Pac. 2d 927, the
Colorado Court, according to defendant's own admission in its
brief at page 13, held that it was a question of fact for the
jury on negligence and contributory negligence, when a driver's
vision is obscured or interfered with by approaching lights. The
Colorado Court also recognized that there is a partial obstruction of vision by oncoming headlights. Accordingly, plaintiff
respectfully submits that visual interference from approaching
nighttime traffic can reasonably be anticipated but the action
of any driver under the circumstances is to be measured in
light of the reasonable prudent man rule and should be submitted to the jury for determination.
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In our instant case, the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were clearly defined and subn1itted to
the jury. The jury found from the conflicting evidence, that
the defendant negligently failed to properly light the \vindrov~,
of dirt obstructing the northbound lane of traffic, that plaintiff's
driver was not contributorily negligent in colliding 'vith said
Y=vrindrow of dirt, and that defendant's negligence was the
sole and proximate cause of the accident. This court has
repeatedly held the question of contributory negligence is
usually for the jury, and that before such issue may be taken
from the jury, defendant's burden of proving both that plaintiff
v1as guilty of contributory negligence, and that such negligence
proxitnately contributed to cause his own injury, must be met
and established with such certainty that reasonable minds
could not differ and find to the contrary. If there is any reasonable basis upon which reasonable minds might conclude that
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence,
either that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or
that such negligence proximately cont~ibuted to cause the
injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question subm1tted
to the jury. See Martin vs. Stephens, 121 Utah 484, 243 Pac.
2d 747. The jury found defendant negligent and plaintiff free
of contributory negligence. This court has on numerous occasions held that the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury
verdict, in a law action, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. Ivy vs. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d,
Page 5, 336 Pac. 2d 781; Niemann vs. Grand Central Market
Inc., 9 Utah 2d 46, 337 Pac. 2d 424; Ostertag vs. Lamont, 9
Utah 2d 130, 339 Pac. 2nd 1022.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that under the facts of the
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instant case there was a question of contributory negligence
to be determined by the jury. The jury's determination was in
favor of the plaintiff and their finding should not be disturbed
on appeal.
POINT II
Tl-IE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
DEFENDANT.
The trial court's instruction No. 10 was not erroneous
nor prejudicial to the defendant. It was a pronouncement of
the general rule set forth in the Dalley case coupled with the
exceptions placed on this rule in the Fretz case. It presented
both plaintiffs and defendant's theory of the case but allowed
the jury to make the final determination of the facts.
The second paragraph of the instruction was not in any
way a comment upon the evidence but merely a statement of
fact common to the knowledge of all drivers of automobiles.
The trial court quoted directly from Fretz vs. Anderson, supra,
in formulating this instruction. Defendant contends that this
was an expression of opinion by the trial court on a disputed
fact, yet on page 10 of its brief states:
CtSome interference from the headlights of oncoming
cars is reasonably to be expected during nighttime
travel."
Courts often take judicial notice of things which are of
common knowledge. See 9B Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Permanent Edition, Pages 394 to
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401. The provisions of Title 78-21-3, Utah Code Annotated,

19 53, in part provides:
((Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law
made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such
knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it."
Courts of other jurisdictions have taken judicial notice of
the fact that headlights of oncoming vehicles interfere with
the vision of the driver of a motor vehicle approaching the
headlights. Long, et ux, vs. Hicks, Wash., 21 Pac. 2d 281;
Herring vs. Holicer Gas Company, Inc., et al, La., 22 Southern 2d 868; Mallett vs. Southern Pacific Company, et al, Cal.,
68 Pac. 2d 281.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court was in
no way commenting upon the evidence in our instant case but
merely taking judicial notice of a fact commonly known to
all drivers of automobiles, and the truth of which has been
admitted by the appellant in its brief. The record is clear and
without contradiction that the headlights of an approaching
automobile interfered with the vision of plaintiff's driver.
Appellant states at page 15 of its brief:

By his own admission any interference by oncoming
lights did not affect his vision."
t t

The record will readily disclose that this is an incorrect statement of the evidence. The driver of plaintiff's truck stated
on several occasions that the headlights of the oncoming automobile interfered with his vision (R. 119,134,142 and 151).
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CONCLUSION
The evidence is without dispute that an oncoming automobile had its headlights burning and those headlights interfered with and partially obstructed the view of plaintiffs
driver. The defendant admitted having placed the windrow of
dirt in the road. Plaintiff's witnesses, including those residing
in homes adjoining the scene of the accident, testified that
they did not observe any burning flare pots in or near the
windrow of dirt on the night in question. The issue of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence
were clearly raised by the evidence and were properly submitted to the jury for their determination. Defendant would
have this court so construe the Dalley case as to formulate
a rule that would ,without exception, declare every nighttime
driver involved in an automobile accident guilty of negligence
for driving upon a street or highway in which there were automobiles approaching from the opposite direction. The sound
reasoning in the Fretz case clearly establishes the fallacy of
this argument. Defendant further advocates that this court
forbid a trial court from taking judicial notice of a fact commonly known to automobile drivers. Trial courts have been
empowered with the authority to acknowledge a commonly
known fact. The fact that an automobile approaching in the
nighttime with headlights burning impairs the vision of a
driver is a fact as commonly known to passengers and operators
of automobiles who have been upon the highway in the nighttime as the fact that snow on the highway makes the same
slippery. Plaintiff respectfully submits that such an instruction
is the law and could in no way be prejudical to the defendant.
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The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

